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This article outlines a method of collaboration that will manifest a high probability of cumulative and progressive re-
sults in science. The method will accomplish this through a division of labour grounded in the order of occurrence of 
human cognitional operations. The following article explores the possibility of a method known as functional special-
ization, distinct tasks presently operative in neuroscience. Functional specialization will enhance collaboration within 
a science as well as initiate implementation of generalized empirical method. Implementation of generalized empirical 
method will be achieved through the focus of individual specialties on specifi c mental operations.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The many tasks of neuroscientifi c studies are 
an evident feature of that broad fi eld of inquiry 
and its application. In this essay, I shall enter into 
details of the divisions of such tasks in the pres-
ent methodological suggestion of ways beyond 
present practice (Henman, 2013, 2015). How-
ever, it seems good to state, in the introduction, 
a fundamental root cause of present problems 
and disorientations (Henman, 2015, Shoppa, Za-
nardi, 2014, p.40). Disorientations relate to the 
intelligent ordering of tasks, which will become 
apparent in the later portions of this essay. I do 
so here in a very elementary descriptive fashion.
First, then, we can share the question, and in-
deed its common answers, “What is a science?” 
Common answers, we easily fi nd, stem from the 
analysis of Aristotle of the nature of science. That 
analysis left the western tradition with a narrow 
and conventional view of good scientifi c work. 
My informed readers may think of other tradi-
tions, like those of China or North Africa, where 
serious sciences of health and building shook off 
that ill-fi tting narrow perspective on the human 
effort to understand and control, even improve 
on, nature. There has been, in the West, a move 
towards what we might call clarity or ideal ty-
pology such that deviants from that clear type 
were considered, in some way, inferior.  This is 
true whether one considers formulations of para-
digms, such as constitute texts on philosophy of 
science, or discussions of paradigm-shifts, such 
as occur in the Kuhnian tradition. 
Therefore, adverting, however briefl y, to the 
position of Aristotle is extremely enlightening. 
Sir David Ross sums up my point: “Throughout 
the whole of his works we fi nd him taking the 
view that all other sciences than the mathemati-
cal have the name of science only by courtesy, 
since they are occupied with matters in which 
contingency plays a part” (Ross, 1949, p.14). 
This simple identifi cation gives us a context for 
understanding what has happened, especially 
in the modern period, in refl ections on science. 
Take, for example, the refl ections that are the 
telling of the story of science, a story of contin-
gencies spread over time and space. One does 
not think of such refl ections as science. Much 
less does one think of applied science such as 
medicine, as science (Douglas, 2013).a  What, 
then, of such topics as the teaching of science, 
the aesthetics of science, the ethics of science, 
the technologies of science? An Aristotelian per-
spective would have us consider such topics to 
be, as it were, outside the world of genuine sci-
ence.
But are not these pursuits intelligent, rich with 
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understandings of data, of the fl ow of events? 
“The immobility of the Aristotelian ideal con-
fl icts with developing natural science, develop-
ing human science [...]” (Lonergan, 1972, p.24) 
and with refl ections on these developments, their 
application, their importance, their ethics and 
their aesthetics.  There is, then, a whole world 
of scientia – in the normal sense of the trans-
lation from the Latin – that escapes from, or is 
denied dignity by, Aristotle’s narrowness. It is 
time to raise the question, “What is science?” 
with a freshness that takes the full modern data 
seriously.
Discussions of Generalized Empirical Method 
(GEM) as a means of including both the data of 
sense and the data of consciousness in scientifi c 
research implicitly raise issues about just what 
that new science might consist in (McShane, 
2013). This article will outline the structure of 
that new science which will be found eventually 
to function as a method of implementation of 
GEM (Henman, 2013, 2015).
The essay attempts to outline a method known 
as Functional Specialization. First, I quote Ber-
nard Lonergan’s defi nitions of a method: “Meth-
od is a framework for collaborative creativity” 
(Lonergan, 1973, p.xi). Later Lonergan expands 
on this defi nition to say that “method is a norma-
tive pattern of recurrent and related operations 
yielding cumulative and progressive results” 
(Lonergan, 1973, p.4) So, thinking of both defi -
nitions, would a normative pattern of related 
operations be a framework for collaborative 
creativity, and furthermore, would such activity 
provide cumulative and progressive results? To 
answer these questions I turn now to the data in 
the full reality of human interest in neuroscien-
tifi c work.
2. DIVISIONS OF LABOUR IN NEURO-
SCIENCE  
This section of the essay will distinguish stag-
es from data to results both in past, present and 
future experimentation in an effort to outline the 
“new science”. In order to outline and describe 
the order and function of the divisions that occur 
during the scientifi c process from data to results, 
we begin with a summation of a particular article 
describing an experiment in neuroscience.
2.1 The neurochemical basis of working mem-
ory
Neurons projecting to the prefrontal cortex 
contain a specifi c neurotransmitter, acetylcho-
line, which is delivered by a specifi c type of 
neurotransmitter pathway, the cholinergic path-
way.  Recently, it has been hypothesized that 
an increase in acetylcholine to the frontal cor-
tex might lead to an improvement in working 
memory (Furey et al., 2000). Furey et al. admin-
istered the drug physostigmine (which increases 
the amount of acetylcholine available) to a small 
group of men and women who completed a 
working memory task as a functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging (fMRI) scanner monitored 
their brain activity. Participants completed the 
same task the following day but received a pla-
cebo (saline). The task involved watching a hu-
man face for three seconds, and then after a nine-
second delay when the face was removed, iden-
tifying which of the two or more subsequently 
presented faces was that originally seen.
Participants who received the physostigmine 
showed increased activation in the visual cortex 
during the encoding of the face, activation that 
was signifi cantly lower in the saline condition. 
The physostigmine condition also produced bet-
ter face recognition when participants had to 
decide which of the faces had previously been 
presented. The fi nding suggests that the im-
provement in working memory may be due to 
enhanced visual processing in the earliest stages 
of encoding. One practical example of this may 
be to administer such drugs to patients with stark 
memory defi cits, such as patients with Alzheim-
er’s disease (Robbins et al., 2000, pp.2275-6) 
(Martin, 2003, p.167).
2.2 Functional Research
Before a researcher begins to plan a research 
project, one has a question within a hypothesis 
or a hypothesis. Once the question or the hypoth-
esis has been formulated, the researcher works 
out what form of data will be required to test the 
question or the hypothesis, and the type of data 
required dictates the type of experiment required 
and the various technologies to be employed to 
provide the required data. Various meetings are 
held with colleagues to discuss the hypothesis 
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and the form that an experiment might take. 
An experiment such as the one described above 
requires a signifi cant amount of planning before 
the experiment can occur. There are proposals, 
consent forms to ethics committees when using 
human subjects, applications for funding and/or 
grants need to be made, planning out the mate-
rials required, preparing images of faces, deter-
mining adequate times for recognition, selecting 
proper timing devices, staff required, facilities, 
recording technology, access to fMRI scanning 
technology, fi nding subjects, consent forms for 
subjects to sign, determining what information 
is to be conveyed to subjects prior to the actual 
conducting of the experiment, setting the date 
and place, plans for no-show subjects, approving 
and acquiring medications, interviewing sub-
jects regarding their physical, psychological and 
mental health and suitability for the experiment, 
and fi nally, meetings with colleagues to monitor 
stages of planning to ensure all necessary plan-
ning is being carried out properly. This listing 
provides one with some idea of the immensity of 
conducting any research project.
Seasoned researchers would be familiar with 
this entire process. This process of planning can 
take months or a year or more before the experi-
ment is fi nally conducted. Even though, in the 
present case, the experiment took place over two 
days, the post-experiment work can also take 
weeks, months or years to understand the data 
and what to do next.
Taking into consideration both the data of 
sense and the data of consciousness, a brief out-
line of the cognitive operations involved in the 
above planning stages follows. A brief defi nition 
of Generalized Empirical Method describes the 
focus of this process.
“Generalized empirical method operates on a combina-
tion of both the data of sense and the data of conscious-
ness: it does not treat of objects without taking into 
account the corresponding operations of the subject; it 
does not treat of the subject’s operations without tak-
ing into account the corresponding objects” (Lonergan, 
1985, p. 141).
What operations correspond with the planning 
stages in the above description of the process 
prior to the experiment? The pre-experimental 
tasks that need to be accomplished are initiated 
by questions towards planning and practicality. 
So, a series of questions such as, What kind of 
experiment will test the hypothesis? Who will 
write the research proposal? Who will draft the 
ethics consent form? Who will seek out human 
subjects? Who will reserve time on the MRI 
scanner? What type of recording devices is re-
quired? What information is to be communi-
cated to the subjects prior to the conducting of 
the experiment? Who will draft a request for the 
medications required? One can easily notice that 
these are common sense activities orientated to-
wards practicality and not scientifi c in a theoreti-
cal context. But these questions do reveal a reach 
for an ordered structure of achieving outcomes. 
The questions are eventually resolved through 
insights into the different talents or capabilities 
of the various colleagues involved in the plan-
ning stage. Once these insights are achieved the 
group makes decisions on who will do what. In 
this manner, an ordered structure, from the data 
of the hypothesis, to questions, to insights, to 
judgments about the correctness of their insights 
and to fi nal decisions, occurs all through the 
planning stage. The cognitive structure orders 
the process heuristically towards achieving the 
desired outcome. I would note here that a paral-
lel complexity occurs in venturing into work in 
any of the specialties, but brevity requires that I 
not repeat the details in the other specialties.
When these activities and tasks are accom-
plished, the next step is running the experiment, 
and even this process is not pure scientifi c know-
ing. It is in the order of doing in terms of imple-
menting a process organized by all that has gone 
before, but it too requires planning. Ensuring all 
devices are ready and working properly, all the 
subjects are present, medications are prepared, 
initiating the proper effi cient order and detailed 
operation of the experiment so that the data de-
sired is objectively achieved. So, the operations 
involved are a checklist of questions, and in 
summary; Do we have everything here required 
to run this experiment? The question initiates an 
ordering of procedures of checking for last min-
ute details. If all is ready, a judgment is made 
that all is ready, and a fi nal decision is made to 
begin. 
The overall outcome of all the work prior to 
running the experiment was to obtain data that 
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will, hopefully, help in testing the original hy-
pothesis. This entire process, then has been one 
focused on gathering data. It is a focus of atten-
tion towards that one outcome. Attention is an 
act of consciousness. As much as other opera-
tions such as questioning, understanding, judg-
ing and deciding occur throughout the process 
(Henman, 2013, p.51. Lonergan, 1992, pp.343, 
361), attending to the outcome of gathering the 
data was the overall focus at that stage of the 
process. The fi nal process in obtaining that data 
was to run the experiment.
The experiment was run as described above 
and in the article sited. It is in the order of doing 
where attention to detail of procedure is para-
mount in terms of each stage of the experiment. 
Timing of the various phases of the experiment is 
crucial. Earlier stages of planning were designed 
to ensure that such is the case. One can envisage 
possible test runs prior to the actual experiment 
to ensure that everyone involved understands his 
or her role or function and that all equipment is 
in proper working order. There are operations 
of cognition involved in attention to detail and 
one’s understanding of not only his or her role, 
but also some overview of the entire experiment 
and how their function or role fi ts into the over-
all plan. The experiment was conducted and the 
data had been recorded and reproduced.
The data consist of pictorials showing the re-
sults of the fMRI scans followed by two graphs 
all reproduced in the original article (Furey et 
al., 1997). Figure 1 of the fMRI scans reveals 
patterns of regional cerebral blood fl ow (rCBF) 
increasing during working memory (WM) tasks 
as compared with rest for the off and on drug 
conditions as well as the group comparison of 
activations. Figure 2 graphs the rCBF according 
to drug response in the right prefrontal cortex. 
Figure 3 consists of graphs showing the change 
in rCBF in relation to the changes in the reaction 
time of facial recognition. These three fi gures 
represent the data derived from the experiment.
2.3 Functional Interpretation
The second task is to understand just what 
this extended data means. This task is focused 
on interpretation or understanding. The division 
of tasks correlate to acts of cognition and not to 
different forms of data, which traditionally spec-
ifi ed a science. First, the researchers attended to 
the many processes orientated to gathering data 
and now the second task is focused on under-
standing that data. The following is an excerpt 
from the article by the authors offering their in-
terpretations of the data.
“Given that acetylcholinesterase inhibitors prolong 
acetylcholine activity at the synapse, one might expect 
improvement in performance to be associated with in-
creased rCBF in a task-specifi c brain region, yet we ob-
served a reduction in right prefrontal rCBF. One pos-
sible explanation is that reduced activation in right 
prefrontal cortex may refl ect the shorter time re-
quired to perform the WM task, although several pa-
pers, including a recent functional magnetic resonance 
imaging study, indicate that right prefrontal activity is 
associated more with maintenance of an active repre-
sentation over the memory delay than with response 
selection. 
The observed reduction of right prefrontal activity 
might have been a direct effect of physostigmine. 
Anatomically, the synaptic circuitry of cholinergic 
prefrontal fi bers includes symmetric synapses on 
pyramidal cells; symmetric synaptic morphology 
is characteristic of inhibitory mechanisms. It is un-
clear, however, why a direct inhibition of right prefron-
tal activity would be correlated with improved WM 
performance. Moreover, direct inhibition demands 
neuronal activity and therefore may result in increased 
rather than decreased cerebral blood fl ow. 
An alternative explanation for the physostigmine-
induced reduction of the right prefrontal rCBF re-
sponse is that right prefrontal activity is associated 
with the effort needed to perform the WM task, and 
that this region is recruited as the effort required 
to perform the task increases. Prefrontal cortex may 
become more active with tasks that require a greater al-
location of attentional resources. A PET study of word 
list recall showed that increased memory load resulted 
in greater rCBF increases in frontal cortex as well as 
in other brain structures. Another PET study showed 
that increases in the diffi culty of a face-matching task 
increased rCBF in the right midfrontal gyrus with a lo-
cal maximum 6 mm from one of the anterior local max-
ima identifi ed in this study. Similarly, studies of event-
related electrophysiological potentials show that the 
response amplitude in the prefrontal cortex increases 
with task diffi culty during WM. The anticholinester-
ase effects of physostigmine may enhance effi ciency 
of WM processes, thus reducing the effort required 
to perform the task and the need to recruit prefron-
tal cortex. The mechanism by which physostigmine 
reduces effortful processing during WM remains un-
clear. Physostigmine may enhance effi ciency by am-
plifying processing of information in the focus of at-
tentionb  or by minimizing the effects of distracting 




The authors of this article have offered fi ve 
possible explanations (Bold) for the results of 
the experiment and three alternative explana-
tions (Italics) by other researchers conducting 
different experiments with a similar objective. 
The fi ve explanations offered on Furey’s experi-
mental results were achieved by correlating the 
results of the three different recordings during 
the experiment. The researchers admit that much 
is still unclear about what exactly is enhancing 
the effi cacy of working memory.
2.4 Functional History: Context of Interpreta-
tions
The fact that much is unclear and various pos-
sible interpretations have been offered brings 
us to a third task in the scientifi c process. This 
task focuses on the context of the experiment, 
the experimenter and the various explanations 
with an effort to make a judgment on the con-
text of interpretations. The specialist in this 
zone brings forth the various interpretations and 
judges which ones are viable for further study. 
In order to do this a review is carried out of the 
various stages leading up to the interpretations, 
as well as on the conducting of the experiment. 
Once such a reconstruction of the interpretative 
process is completed, the historian of contexts 
attempts to judge which interpretations should 
be brought forward for further study, further ex-
perimentation and refl ection (Lonergan, 1972, 
p.203). As much as the specialist, in this zone, 
is focused on judgment, all cognitive operations 
are active. Attention to the various stages of the 
process are required; understanding what the hy-
pothesis is, what questions were asked, how the 
experiment was comprised, how it was run, how 
the data was collected and how it was interpret-
ed. These stages of cognitional operations are all 
part of the process of arriving at a judgment on 
which interpretations are worthy of passing on to 
the next stage of the scientifi c process.
One needs a more than an adequate under-
standing of the science in question to function 
properly in this specialty. Lonergan makes the 
point in the following.
“Clearly, therefore, the historian of any discipline has 
to have a thorough knowledge and understanding of the 
whole subject. And it is not enough that he understand 
it any way at all, but he must have a systematic under-
standing of it. For the precept, when applied to history, 
means that successive systems which have developed 
over a period of time have to be understood. The sys-
tematic understanding of a development ought to make 
use of an analogy with the development that takes place 
in the mind of the investigator who learns about the 
subject, and this interior development within the mind 
of the investigator ought to parallel the historical pro-
cess by which the science itself developed.” (Lonergan, 
1960, pp.130-132)
2.5 Functional Dialectics
The historical fact of having more than one pos-
sible interpretation of the data obtained from the 
experiment raises the issue of deciding which in-
terpretation passed forward from functional his-
tory is the most viable or best explains the results 
of the experiment. The focus here at this stage 
is on the cognitive act of decision. How is such 
a decision to be accomplished? The differing 
interpretations offered reveal that much is still 
unknown about the workings and functioning of 
the brain in terms of working memory, the spe-
cifi c interaction of various chemicals involved, 
how brain chemistry affects attention: if so, how 
does it achieve this, and so much more. Obvi-
ously more experimentation will be required in 
the area of working memory. Are there particu-
lar points made in the interpretations that can be 
brought forward that would appear to have some 
basis for further development in understand-
ing the functioning of working memory? This 
is addressed in the discussion section of the es-
say. This process involves comparison, but not 
in some common sense descriptive mode. Such 
comparison requires that the dialectician oper-
ate out of a foundational context regarding an 
understanding of his or her own mental opera-
tions as well as familiarity with the rules of inter-
pretationc that contribute to an eventual genetic 
sequence of development (Lonergan, 1992, pp. 
600-603). The task of dialectic is to establish
“a fi nal objectifi cation of horizon when the results of 
the foregoing process are themselves regarded as mate-
rials, when they are assembled, completed, compared, 
reduced, classifi ed, selected, when positions and coun-
ter-positions are distinguished, when positions are de-
veloped and counter-positions are reversed (Lonergan, 
1972, p.250).”
2.6 Interlude
Before moving forward to further stages, it 
will be helpful to outline briefl y, what has been 
going forward up to this point in the process. 
Four tasks have been described 1) research with 
a focus on attention to gathering data, 2) inter-
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pretation with a focus on understanding the data, 
3) history with a focus on judging the contexts of 
the various interpretations offered and 4) dialec-
tic, deciding which interpretation(s) is worthy of 
further study. Each stage refl ects on the results 
of the former stage. The results of each stage are 
the “datum” for the next stage, but the focus of 
each stage is on a different mental operation. So, 
researchers focus on attention, interpreters on 
understanding, historians on judging the story 
and dialecticians deciding about the progress of 
the story. The order of the focus parallels the un-
folding structure of human knowing (Henman, 
2013, p.51, Lonergan, 1992, p.299). Specializa-
tion is grounded in the cognitive operations. Be-
cause it follows the cognitive order, from experi-
ence (attending to data), understanding, judging 
and deciding, it provides a greater possibility of 
more cumulative and progressive results. Such 
interdependence of the emerging specializations 
brings to the process a form of collaboration that 
is functional in as much as each specialist is in-
tentionally focusing on providing data for the 
next task.
The results of the fi rst phase provide data for 
the second phase. A further feature of these four 
specialities is that they bring forward work from 
the past into the present with an orientation to 
the future. The second phase begins with the 
speciality foundations but springs from the dia-
lectician’s efforts to point towards progress.
2.7 Functional Foundations
This second phase of functional collaboration, 
as an orientation to the future, pushes forward 
the decisions of the previous specialty on what 
specifi cally is a position from phase one. Foun-
dations, the fi fth speciality, is focused on deci-
sion as is dialectic. Dialectic determined which 
explanation was the best available from those 
offered by the historian. Foundations focus on 
whether or not the interpretation offered is an ad-
equate explanatory account of the data. Are there 
results from the previous work that will lead to 
further developments in the fi eld of neurosci-
ence research relating to medications to improve 
working memory and treat Alzheimer’s disease? 
This stage of deliberation is one of appropriation 
of the researcher’s own procedural cognitional 
operations that underlie the position. The fol-
lowing quotation from the discussion section of 
their article states what the researchers consid-
ered as the main result of their experiment.    
“The results of this study show that enhancement of 
cholinergic neurotransmission results in an improve-
ment in WM effi ciency that is correlated with an altera-
tion of brain activity in a cortical region known to play 
a central role in WM.” (Furey et al, 1997)
The specialty foundations, takes a position on 
the decision offered in dialectics, but what is a 
position? Lonergan offers the following as the 
cognitional and the epistemological foundations 
of a position. The decision offered in dialectic 
will be a position if:
1) the knowledge reached is the result of the 
process of intelligent and rational operations and 
not some sub-division of the ‘already out there 
now’;
2) the researcher becomes known when he or 
she affi rms him/herself intelligently and reason-
ably  and is not known yet in any prior ‘existen-
tial’ state; and
3) objectivity is conceived as a consequence 
of intelligent inquiry and critical refl ection, and 
not as a property of vital anticipation, extrover-
sion, and satisfaction (Lonergan, 1992, p.413).d
 Foundations, then, decides if the account of-
fered is an explanatory account of the data corre-
lates with the three characteristics of a metasci-
entifi c position. The above quotation from Furey 
is a descriptive account. A partial explanation 
for this result is that physostigmine which is an 
acetylcholinesterase inhibitor increases the du-
ration of action of acetylcholine at the synapse. 
Regional blood fl ows in the prefrontal cortex re-
acted differently than expected, and the authors 
were unable to explain this and offered various 
possible explanations. No defi nitive explanation 
was offered in the article. Underlying this failure 
is methodological unclarity. Foundations, then 
focuses on what methodological improvement in 
a given research experiment is a position that is 
worth passing on. Resolving the lack of a meth-
odological clear explanation serves as a position 
to be passed on to our next specialty, policies.
2.8 Functional Policy
The task of metapolicy is to work out what 
plans can be constructed or developed grounded 
in the position taken in foundations. The focus 
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is on judgment, to develop policies and to judge 
which policies are viable. The function of de-
veloping policies is to establish a sequence of 
plans of operation that are orientated towards 
further development within the science. What 
improved plans of operation can be developed 
based on the results of Furey’s experiment? The 
results of Furey’s experiment reveal that further 
experimentation is required especially as some 
results were unexpected regarding the reduction 
of rCBF in the right prefrontal region. What is 
the methodological explanation for this and how 
is it relevant to working memory? A policy to be 
established is that further precise experimenta-
tion, regarding the correlation between changes 
in brain activity and the enhancement of cho-
linergic neurotransmission be carried out in an 
effort to understand the unexpected results. We 
now move to our next specialty, systematics, 
which focuses on understanding what this policy 
means in the full context of a genetic systematics 
of the science.
2.9 Functional Systematics
Systematics focuses on the cognitive act of 
understanding.  The specialist is attempting to 
understand contextually the results of the prior 
specialities that have culminated into policies. 
The overall outcome is to provide a genetic sys-
tematic understanding of the policy that can be 
developed into an adequate form of communi-
cation for both all other seven specialists and 
for the various possible audiences. What does 
the policy of further experimentation mean? On 
what forms of experimentation should research-
ers focus? What methodological steps, if any, 
have been missed or operationally misplaced? 
These questions are a small sampling of the 
types of questions that systematics attempts to 
answer in relationship to the particular experi-
ment discussed in this article. But to conceive 
of it in its intrinsic structure is a huge task of 
the future. There is at present little reach towards 
even an imagining of the layered structuring of 
its developmental neurodynamics. Think of the 
problem of accounting for the evolving patterns 
of the pre-natal brain; think of the growth of a 
sunfl ower. Then think of an inquiry into such 
different thinkings that would become a genetic 
sequencing of the open advancing of theories of 
all such things.
2.10 Functional Communications
The understanding that has come forward 
from systematics must now be expressed selec-
tively in various ways that are appropriate to 
the various possible audiences. Those audiences 
certainly include researchers, clinicians and non-
technical. Furey’s article was written for other 
researchers. The language is technical, and one 
requires a background in neuroscience in order 
to understand the meaning correctly. Clinicians 
would have some grasp of the article’s meaning 
but an adequate form of communication for the 
clinician would focus more on possible treat-
ment regimens. The patient or the non-technical-
ly trained person would require another form of 
expression that would provide that group with 
some common sense description of what is go-
ing forward. At this stage, Fuery’s work would 
not warrant any treatment regimens.
For our purposes the fi rst form of communica-
tion is relevant, that of the technical form of ex-
pression to other experimental neuroscientists. 
This form of communication is now data to be 
recycled through the eight functional speciali-
ties. Note that the communication also is to reach 
the various specialists. In other words, the pro-
cess of functional specialization begins again, 
but with a fresh lift of method and context.
The results of Furey’s work became data for 
further experimentation. In fact, many experi-
ments were carried out in the years following 
Furey’s work. F. Coelho and J. Birks carried out 
a study of experiments and reviews by search-
ing the Cochrane Controlled Trials Register. One 
could detect elements of our precise collabora-
tive process in this work, but it would be a sepa-
rate article. The overall conclusion was that the 
evidence of effectiveness of physostigmine for 
the symptomatic treatment of Alzheimer’s dis-
ease is limited (Coelho and Birks, 2001). This 
result differs from the conclusion of Furey’s 
1997 article. 
“The results of this study show that enhancement of 
cholinergic neurotransmission results in an improve-
ment in WM effi ciency that is correlated with an altera-
tion of brain activity in a cortical region known to play 
a central role in WM” (Furey et al., 1997).  
It is to be noted that Furey’s experiment fo-
cused on WM in healthy subjects whereas 
Coehlo and Birk’s search through experiments 
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and reviews focused on experiments with AD 
subjects. The interpretation of these results led 
to other experimentation with the cholinergic 
drugs donepezil, rivastigmine and galantamine 
in order to assess their possible aid in the treat-
ment of AD. These reviews can be viewed at 
the Pub Med, US National Library of Medicine 
at:http://community.cochrane.org/sites/default/
fi les/uploads/EPPR/CDSR_Impact-factor_and-
usage-report_2013.pdf or the Cochrane Library 
Database Systems at: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.
gov/pubmed/16437532 .
The above search by Coelho and Birk is clas-
sifi ed as research, the fi rst specialty, a gathering 
of statistical data to be cycled through the eight 
functional specialities. In that manner of orga-
nizing tasks, a higher control of understanding 
is initiated.
Dr. Furey has continued with the National 
Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) to experi-
ment with working memory and various studies 
have been published of her results. See: https://
intramural.nimh.nih.gov/research/clinicians/
sc_furey_m.html
for some of her publications and more re-
cently publications with Science Direct (Furey, 
2009, pp.322-332). Furey’s work infl uenced the 
focus and expansion of her later research as well 
as others. In that manner, there was ongoing col-
laboration and extension of the original work 
into other possible zones. What that process 
lacked was a division of labour structured by 
the order of the operations of human cognition, 
as outlined in this article above, but the compo-
nents of that possibility were there.
2.11 Functional Specialization
(Lonergan, 1972, ch.5; Shoppa and Zanardi, 
2014, p. 28; McShane, 2013)
A brief outline of the different specialities 
and their functions has been provided above. 
The following provides a brief overview of the 
structure and meaning of this outline. The full 
work of research from data to results has been 
divided up into eight tasks grounded in the cog-
nitive operations of the human intellect. Why 
are there eight divisions? There are four distinct 
operations of the intellectual process: attention, 
understanding, judgment and decision. These 
four operations give a heuristic pattern to know-
ing. Each operation presupposes the former op-
eration as well as reaching for the succeeding 
operation. Data evoke curiosity expressed in the 
form of a question. A question seeks insight or 
understanding, understanding requires formula-
tion into a judgment and judgment occurs as an 
answer to an IS question; Is it so? A decision is 
in the form of a to-do Yes or No regarding the 
method of verifi cation. This heuristic is develop-
mental as former verifi ed insights into data form 
the ground for further questions and insights to 
be added to the composite of knowledge in a par-
ticular zone.
Each functional specialty is grounded in and 
focused on one of the cognitive operations so 
that development is made possible in an orga-
nized manner. There is a methodological order-
ing of content of the science in question (Mc-
Shane, 1970, p.259). The fi rst four specialties, 
the fi rst phase, bring forward work from the past, 
and the second phase is orientated towards the 
future as to what this former work can contribute 
to the development of a particular zone or sci-
ence. The following diagram provides an image 
of the fl ow of functional specialization.
A brief summary of the eight specialities de-
scribes the specifi c focus of each specialty (An-
derson, 1996, p.167). 
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Phase One-Past    Phase Two-Future
Dialectics                    Decision      Foundations
↑              ↓
History        Judgment        Policy
↑              ↓
Interpretation        Understanding       Systematics
↑              ↓
Research      Attention      Communications







Research: Collecting and selecting the rel-
evant data
Interpretation: Establishing the meaning of 
the data.
History: Working out what is going forward.
Dialectics: Sorting through the various inter-
pretations and histories with the aim of deciding 
which one is the best explanation.
Foundations: Expressing the best directions 
forward in a way that is not tied to particular 
places, ages and times.
Policy: Reaching for relevant pragmatic truths 
within a foundational context.
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Systematics: Drawing on past strategies and 
discoveries while envisaging future concrete 
possibilities and their probabilities.
Communications: Collaborative refl ection 
on the local level that selects creatively from the 
range of possibilities developed in the prior sev-
en specialities with a view to developing forms 
of communication to the various possible audi-
ences.
3. DISCUSSION
In the Introduction, I quoted two defi nitions 
by Bernard Lonergan and raised two questions, 
which I repeat here and attempt to answer. Meth-
od is a framework for collaborative creativity 
(Method in Theology, 1973, p.xi) and method 
is a normative pattern of recurrent and related 
operations yielding cumulative and progressive 
results (Method in Theology, 1973, p.4).
In as much as each of the specialties is ground-
ed in the heuristic structure of cognition there is 
also a functional capacity of performance im-
bedded in the structure. Each specialty has a 
function to be passed on to the next specialty and 
those functions form an interlocking of interde-
pendence that works toward a completed whole. 
The division of labour that functional specializa-
tion orchestrates also provides a form of collabo-
ration that increases the probabilities of cumu-
lative and progressive results in a science. No 
scientist today can be a specialist in all zones of 
a science (Zanardi, 2011, pp.19-54).e 
Neuroscience draws on physics for its under-
standing of electrical voltage regarding synaptic 
events, chemistry and biochemistry, cellular bi-
ology, anatomy, physiology, and psychology in 
its attempts to understand the human brain and 
its relationship to the body, to development and 
to consciousness. 
“For good or ill a division of labour has to be accepted, 
and this is brought about by dividing and then subdivid-
ing the fi eld of relevant data. [...] to make the special-
ist one who knows more and more about less and less” 
(Lonergan, 1973, p.125, Agoritsas, 2013, p.448).f 
A division of labour focuses not just on the 
data of the content results of each specialty but 
also on the data of the cognitive operations mak-
ing possible a methodical ordering of content 
which makes possible a higher probability of 
cumulative and progressive results in an age of 
ever increasing data. Such a division distributes 
the various tasks in an orderly and manageable 
manner. The focus on both the data passed on 
from one specialty to another and on a particular 
cognitional operation challenges the scientist not 
only to be a specialist in one zone of a science, 
such as the infl uence of drugs on working memo-
ry, but also as a specialist in one of the functional 
specialities. So, the specialist focused on history 
need not only an adequate background on work-
ing memory as it pertains to neuroscience but a 
good knowledge of the history of work accom-
plished on working memory and an understand-
ing of the role of judgment in scientifi c knowing. 
Would a normative pattern of related operations 
be a framework for collaborative creativity and 
furthermore, would such activity provide cumu-
lative and progressive results? Creativity is the 
exercise of the human capacity to raise the ques-
tions that have not been asked and then to fol-
low through to achieve the insights that call for 
verifi cation. There is the challenge of openness 
in the scientist’s psychological and intellectual 
poise towards their work (McShane, 2013, chs 3 
& 4). Openness is expressed in the form of one’s 
curiosity, one’s ability to ask questions, uninhib-
ited by ulterior motives.
“Arts and our aesthetic experience in the form of inter-
pretation are thus connected to how we learn” (Gillis, 
2015, p. 138).g 
Curiosity is the genesis of one’s questions 
leading to understanding, the normal and natural 
resolution to a question (Henman, 1984, ch.1 & 
2. Lonergan, 1992, pp.34-35). Any other motive 
for asking a question becomes an inhibition to 
scientifi c achievement (Lonergan, 1992, Ch.6, 
sec. 2.7 & ch.7 sec 6, 7, 8).
There are three distinct forms of questions 
that are exercised during the functioning of the 
eight functional specialities. There is the “what” 
question in functional research: what data are 
relevant to this study? There is the what ques-
tion for interpreters: what is the meaning of this 
datum? The historian: what is the context of this 
interpretation? The dialectician: what interpreta-
tion is the best? The Foundational person shifts 
to a new form of question: an Is it so? type ques-
tion or Is this interpretation a position? Policy 
asks the question: What is to be done with this 
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interpretation? Systematics asks what this policy 
means. Communications asks what form of com-
munication is to be developed and for whom. 
Therefore, we have What questions, Is questions 
and What to do questions. 
Questions can have many motivations or dis-
tractions. A question normatively seeks under-
standing. Functional specialization will begin to 
offset ulterior motivations by its focus on cogni-
tive operations. Such extended focus over time 
would achieve this outcome. That achievement 
would increase the creative aspect of curios-
ity with a more focused attention on the desire 
to understand as opposed to other motivations 
(Henman, 2010, 2012). Because the pattern of 
functional specialization divides the question 
types and cognitive operations among special-
ists, it encourages and shares the creative capac-
ity among the specialists increasing the prob-
ability of development. This sharing of intellec-
tual capacities further reveals the collaborative 
character of functional specialization.
Cumulative and progressive results occur 
when labour is divided along the lines of the 
cognitive operations because the heuristic struc-
ture of attention, understanding, judgment and 
decision are the ground of human progress (Lo-
nergan, 1992, p.8). Insights correct, revise or 
build on former insights. Insight is an integral 
operation. The centrality of insight in cognitive 
activity provides the possibility for develop-
ment in a science or zone of enquiry. The act of 
insight integrates former insights into a higher 
viewpoint modestly exemplifi ed in the transi-
tion from understanding addition to understand-
ing subtraction or the transition from Newtonian 
mechanics to Relativity theory. The emergence 
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Endnotes
a:  Douglas’ article goes to great length debating the 
dialectical history between pure and applied science. 
Refl ection on scientifi c performance would end this 
debate, but such work is part of the process of a his-
tory of a developing science. 
b: The issue of attention or lack thereof may be the 
more adequate explanation of some forms of demen-
tia and AD. Patterns of chemistry formed as corre-
lates to experience are related to one’s conscious at-
tention to experience. Trauma, tragic loss, relational 
breakdown, and the inability to fi nalize situations on 
the level of decision can create a distraction so that 
of new questions and new insights is not an auto-
matic process, but the order is intelligible. They 
are the result of a dedication to understand, or 
the unrestricted desire to understand (Lonergan, 
1992, pp.667-669), a curiosity that in principle, 
knows no bounds.
4. CONCLUSION
The operation of functional specialization in 
the sciences would eventually implement Gener-
alized Empirical Method (GEM) constituting the 
New Science.  Its implementation would ensure 
that scientists take into account not only the data 
of sense but also the data of consciousness when 
performing scientifi c work thereby increasing 
the odds of a systematic understanding of data 
generating a genetic sequencing of instances of 
development. As the eight different specialists 
become more at home with GEM (McShane, 
1976) any tendencies towards reductionism will 
be gradually countered (Henman, 2015). Only 
through the ordered functioning of the speciali-
ties, will a more adequate understanding of their 
function as the new science come to be appreci-
ated in terms of the functional ordering of results 
that occur. Without knowledge of the order of 
the operations expressed in functional special-
ization, a degree of haphazardness is present in 
the work of a science.i  Functional specializa-
tion can reduce such randomness due to the very 
structure of the human intellectual operations 
increasing the probabilities of cumulative and 
progressive results. The transition from present 
operations to GEM, taking into account both the 
data of sense and the data of consciousness, will 
be one of historical relevance and far-reaching in 
terms of time. It will be one of centuries before 
we are at home in such a process.
Corresponding Author:
Robert. Henman,
Lecturer in Philosophy and Ethics
Mount Saint Vincent University,
901-247 Regency Park Drive, B3S 0A5
Halifax, Nova Scotia (Canada)
E-mail: Robert.Henman@MSVU.CA
Phone: 902-444-0359 
Copyright © 2016 by Ass. Crossing Dialogues, Italy
www.crossingdialogues.com/journal.htm 20
one’s ability to attend to experience is weakened re-
sulting in insuffi cient patterns of chemistry correlat-
ing to the experience. As well as searching for phar-
macological solutions to forms of dementia and AD, 
it would be helpful to work on both this solution as 
well as the therapeutic side and those innate systems 
of dysfunctionalism that exist in current social cul-
tures. See Martin (2003) pages 156-157 for a discus-
sion of how repeating synapsis form more permanent 
memories.   
c: The rules of interpretation would require a further 
lengthy article. See Lonergan, 1993, pp. 600-603.
d: I have edited the quotation of Lonergan to fi t the 
particular context of neuroscience research. 
e: Professor Zanardi explores methodologically the 
binding problem and the diffi culty of working out 
the various correlations and processes involved in 
the formation of sensation. The case for functional 
specialization is supported by his analysis of what 
is increasingly found to be a series of very complex 
processes. 
f: Agoritsas and Guyatt report that Medline publishes 
more than 2000 articles a day. A portion of those ar-
ticles would be in the area of neuroscience and oth-
ers related to the ongoing work of neuroscience. This 
does not include textbooks. This immensity of output 
only serves to further support the need for a method 
of organizing the content of all the sciences if de-
velopment and progress are to be achieved and the 
probabilities of such are to be raised.
g: Gillis explores the aesthetic experience in terms of 
its ability to develop the openness of one’s wonder as 
the ground of human aspiration and well-being in a 
world in which artistic training and scientifi c training 
can and often does stifl e one’s curiosity. Gillis was 
kind enough to allow me to read her completed thesis 
and she does have plans for eventual publishing.  
h: Bernard Lonergan outlined functional specializa-
tion as a method of establishing theology as a sci-
ence. It has been pointed out by Professor Karl Rah-
ner that the method would also apply to any of the 
sciences. Rahner, K. (1970) Kritische bemerkungen 
zu B.J.F.Lonergan’s Aufsatz: Functional specialties 
in theology, Gregorianum, vol.51, page 537. “ Loner-
gan’s theological methodology seems to so general 
that it applies equally to all sciences, and so is not 
a method of theology as such but a general method 
of science illustrated by examples from theology.” 
Quinn (2015) explores how generalized empirical 
method within the context of functional collaboration 
will respond to the problems of imagined molecules 
in systems theory in biology. Pages 18-19.  Shute 
(2015) listed the following applications of functional 
specialization in footnote 8, page 69. 
Philip McShane has explored the implications of 
functional specialization in physics in  “Elevating 
Insight: Spacetime as Paradigm Problem”, Method: 
Journal of Lonergan Studies 19/2 (2001); in econom-
ics in, Economics for Everyone (Halifax: Axial Press, 
2002), chapter 3; in linguistics in A Brief History of 
Time (Halifax: Axial Press, 1998); in musicology in 
The Shaping of Foundations Washington, DC: Uni-
versity Press of America, 1976), chapter 2, available 
online at www.philipmcshane.ca; and in literature in 
Lonergan’s Challenge to the University and the Econ-
omy (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 
1980), chapter 5 available online at www.philipmcsha-
ne.ca. Bruce Anderson in Discovery in Legal Deci-
sion-Making (London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
1996), discusses functional specialization as applied 
in philosophy of law. Terrance Quinn discusses func-
tional specialization in mathematics in “Refl ection 
on Progress in Mathematics” Journal of Macrody-
namic Analysis 3 (2003) 97-116. Ian Brodie has ap-
plied functional specialization to religious studies in 
“Bernard Lonergan’s Method and Religious Studies: 
Functional Specialties and the Academic Study of 
Religion”, M.A. thesis, Memorial University, 2001. 
More recently there is Scott Halse, Functional Spe-
cialization and Religious Diversity: Bernard Loner-
gan’s Methodology and the Philosophy of Religion, 
PhD. Thesis, McGill University, 2008. Most recent-
ly, a functional specialist approach has been applied 
to the practical issue of housing. See Sean McNelis, 
Making Progress in Housing: A Framework for Col-
laborative Research (Oxon: Routledge, 2014).
i: Theil, Stefan, (2015) Scientifi c American, Volume 
313, Issue 4. Theil highlights the diffi culty of col-
laboration between the European Human Brain Proj-
ect (HBP) and the American Brain Initiative. Politics 
and funding are part of the challenge in this particular 
case but a more overarching and profound challenge 
is the establishment of a method that correlates the 
two projects and their desired outcomes intelligently. 
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